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Racial Discrimination and Home
Ownership
InChapter 8, we consider whether racial discrimination in urban housing
markets causes black households in St. Louis to pay more than white
households for, identical bundles of residential services. To anticipate
these analyses, our findings suggest the magnitude of discrimination
"markups" in the St. Louis housing market may be as high as 6 percent
for a standardized bundle of housing services. When the different struc-
ture of prices inside and outside the ghetto is taken into account, blacks
may have to pay as much as 12 percent more for their units inside the
ghetto than they would have to pay if they were free to shop for housing
outside of it. Several studies of the effects of housing-market discrimina-
tion have made estimates on these price markups, and all but one or two
have found differences as large or larger than those which we have
obtained for St. Louis.
Differentials of this magnitude are a significan.t loss in welfare for
black households. Moreover, the analyses of' home ownership, home
purchase, and mobility presented in Chapter 5raisethe very real possi—
biity that studies concerned solely with price discrimination may have
overlooked still more serious consequences of racial discrimination in
urban housing markets: its effect on the kinds of housing consumed by
black households. In this chapter, we begin to consider this broader
issue.
Though it is incomplete, an important part of the answer to the
question of how racial discrimination distorts the housing consumption
of black households is suggested by the analyses of home ownership and
home purchase in Chapter 5.Thegeneralized least-squares regression
results, presented in Table 5-1, indicate that in the city and county of St.
Louis, black households are 8.8 percentage points less likely to be
owners than are white households,' even after controlling for the influ-
ence of age, education, income, job stability, and life cycle. Thirty-two
percent of the black households in the sample are homeowners; the race
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coefficient indicates that 41 percent would be homeowners if they were
white.
The analysis in Chapter 5furtherindicates that the current probabil-
ity of a household's owning its home cumulates over time as households
move and make purchase decisions. Therefore, it could be argued that
current ownership patterns primarily reflect the historical discrimination
against blacks and provide a misleading view of current conditions. But,
when the probability of home purchase by recent movers is analyzed,
the coefficient of the race dummy variable is also negative and highly
significant (Table 5-3).Only8 percent of recent black movers purchased
homes; the findings in Table 5-3 indicate that if they had been white,
more than 20 percent would have purchased.
The second equation in Table 5-3moreadequately accounts for the
effects of past discrimination against black households by including the
dummy variables for prior tenure. Here again the coefficient of the race
dummy, —.091,indicates that even when past tenure relations as well as
socioeconomic and life-cycle influences are taken into account, the rate
of home purchase by black households is only about half that for
comparable white households.
These results are persuasive evidence that the probabilities of home
ownership and home purchase are lower for black households than they
are for white households of similar income, household size and composi-
tion, and labor-force attachments. But they do not prove that these
differences are caused by racial discrimination. There are, in fact,
several competing explanations for these results. The explanations may
be grouped into three broad categories: (1) differences in the taste for
home ownership between whites and blacks; (2) differences in the
household asset and wealth positions of white and black families, and
differences in permanent incomes; and (3) racial discrimination in the
housing market as the result either of simple price discrimination in the
owner and renter markets or of a more pervasive restriction on the
supply of owner-occupied housing available to blacks. Supply restric-
tions could be supplemented or enforced by simple capital-market dis-
crimination, or by an unwillingness on the part of banks and other
mortgage lenders to finance home purchases by blacks outside the
ghetto.
Though it is virtually impossible to "prove" that the much lower
probability of home ownership of black households is not due to differ-
ences in the taste for home ownership, many of the more commonly
accepted determinants of the tastes of housing consumers are included
as independent variables in the ownership and purchase equations.
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closes no statisticall.y significant differences. Household expectations
about moving frequency may be the only important excluded taste
variable (as will be discussed subsequently, mobility also affects the
economics of home ownership).
However, the mobility analysis presented in Chapter 5 also indi-
cates that, if anything, black households are less likely to move than are
white households of identical socioeconomic characteristics. For black
homeowners, in particular, the results indicate a propensity to move
during a three-year period that is about 9 percentage points lower than
that for comparable whites. The magnitude of this difference is better
appreciated if one recalls that the mean moving rate of sample home-
owners is only 12 percent over a three-year period. The lower p-iobility
rates of black homeowners may arise because the possibility of trading
up to a larger or better owner-occupied unit is less available to black
households, due to limitations on their residential choices; or because
blacks are less often able to move closer to their jobs.
Differences in the asset or wealth positions of black and white
households may account for part of the differences in white and non-
white ownership and purchase probabilities. Unfortunately, the sample
used in this research shares the deficiency of most other surveys in not
including information on household assets and wealth. Therefore, using
these data, no direct test of the asset hypothesis is possible. However,
for several reasons, we doubt that much of the white-black differences in
ownership and purchase are the result of unmeasured differences in
wealth. All three equations include income, years-on-current-job, and
life-cycle variables, which may account for much of the white-black
differences in assets. For most households, black and white, equity in
owner-occupied housing is itself the largest component of net worth.1
Therefore,in the probability-of-purchase model, prior tenure may
account for much of the remaining difference in wealth. Down payment
requirements are a major reason why assets might be expected to affect
the decision to purchase a home. However, Federal Housing Authority
(FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) down-payment requirements,
especially for small single-family homes purchased more than ten years
ago, were small or nonexistent.
Pertinent to the question of assets and wealth, several studies of the
demand for housing have concluded that housing expenditures are more
'For example, recent Survey of Economic Opportunity tabulations indicate that for
lower-middle income families ($5,000— $7,000 per annum), housing equity alone represents
40 percent of the net worth of white households and an even larger proportion of the net
worth of black households. See Appendix C for further details.140 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
strongly related to permanent than to armual income.2 By extension, it
may be argued that the probabilities of home ownership and home
purchase are more strongly related to permanent than to annual
income. Thus, all or part of the difference in the probabilities of home
ownership and home purchase attributed to race in Tables 5-1, 5-2,and
5-3mightbe due to unmeasured black-white differences in permanent
income.
The available data permit only a crude evaluation of this alternative
hypothesis. Permanent-income variables were constructed separately
for blacks and whites by using the average annual income of the head of
the household, reported by education level. Presumably, this averaging
proces's reduces the transitory component of income and provides an
improved estimate of the permanent component.
With few exceptions, average incomes are larger for higher educa-
tion levels and larger for whites than for blacks. Figure 7-5(p.180)
depicts the average incomes by years of education separately for the
samples of black and white households. Equations relating the probabil-
ity of home ownership and the probability of purchase to these perma-
nent-income estimates, as well as to the other socioeconomic character-
istics of the sampled households, are summarized in Table 6-1. The
generalized least-squares estimates of the home ownership model (com-
parable to Table 5-1) are presented in the first column; the second
column presents generalized least-squares estimates of the home-pur-
chase model, including the dummy variables representing prior tenure
(comparable to column 2 of Table 5-3).
In the probability-of-ownership equation, the coefficient of perma-
nent income is smaller than the comparable coefficient for annual
income. The influence of the age variable is much stronger in this
specification, and the years-on-current-job variable has a much larger t
ratio, but the pattern of the life-cycle dummies is about the same. In the
purchase model, the permanent-income variable is itself insignificant;
and most of the explanatory power comes from the age, prior tenure,
and life-cycle variables.
In both the home-ownership and home-purchase equations includ-
ing permanent income, the coefficient of the race dummy is more
negative than the alternative coefficients in Tables 5-1 or 5-3, and its t
ratio more than doubles in the ownership equation.
An alternative and more dubious (both statistically and theoreti-
cally) test of the permanent-income specification uses an estimate of
2Richard F. Muth, Citiesand Housing (Chicago: University ofChicago Press,1969);
Margaret Reid, Housing and Income (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).Racial Discrimination and Home Ownership 141
TABLE 6-1
Generalized Least-Squares Estimates of the Probability of









More than one employed .230'
.0141
Age-squared —.0171
Number of persons —.232' —.172'
Number of children .0222
Female head <45years —.175' —.2331
Female head >45years —.438' —.267'
Household types
Single female <45years —.212'
Single female >45years —.2331 —.2432
Single male <45years —. —.
Single male >45years —.312' —.2372





New household — —.168'
Constant .421'
R2 .332 .343
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housing expenditures as a surrogate for permanent income. The most
obvious statistical problem arises as a result of the fact that the estimate
of housing expenditures for homeowners must be imputed from market
value, using a gross rent multiplier.3 The use of different variables
(monthly rent for renters and market value for owners) transformed by a
constant divisor may produce a spurious correlation. In models like
those in Table 6-1, employing "estimated housing expenditures" as an
independent variable instead of "permanent income," coefficients of the
housing-expenditure variable in the ownership and purchase equations
range between twenty and forty-five times thei.r standard errors, a result
that makes us strongly suspect that the relation is to a significant extent
spurious, arising by construction.
Moreover, on theoretical grounds there is reason to believe that
even an adequate estimate of housing expenditures would not provide
permanent-income measures which are neutral between blacks and
whites or between homeowners and renters. if price discrimination
exists in the housing market, only a demand elasticity of one for housing
would prevent housing expenditures from being a biased estimate of the
permanent incomes of black households. If housing demand is price
elastic for blacks, price discrimination will bias this measure of perma-
nent income downward for them and will reduce the race coefficient
when the ownership and purchase equations are estimated.4 This bias is
accentuated if housing-market discrimination reduces black home own-
ership and if for any reason, homeowners spend more for housing than
renters of the same income. The coefficients of the race dummy variable
for these alternative specifications are summarized in Table 6-2. All 18
estimated coefficients for the race dummy are negative, and 17 are
significant at the .05level.Holding other factors constant, Table 6-2
indicates that black households are between 4 and 19 percentage points
less likely to be homeowners than are white households. For households
who have recently moved, the range of estimated coefficients implies
that black households are between 3 and 22 percentage points less likely
3The housing-expenditure models use housing value divided by 100 as an estimate of
homeowners' monthly expenditure. This gross rent multiplier is widely used in housing-
market analysis (Muth) to make market value roughly commensurate with monthly rent. In
addition to the results reported, we estimated equations using gross rent multipliers of 1/185
and'/164.Theseratios were derived by regressing monthly rent and value upon a detailed
set of the individual characteristics of rental and owner-occupied units and thus deriving
estimates of the equivalent value of the average rental unit (165xrent) and the average
rental fee for the characteristics of owner-occupied units (value/185). The race coefficients
were indistinguishable from those presented.
4Muth, Citiesand Housing.Racial Discrimination and Home Ownership 143
TABLE 6-2
Coefficients and t Ratios of Race Variable in Equations Using Alternative
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NOTE: Figures in parenthesis aretratios.
topurchasetheir dwelling unit than otherwise comparable white house-
holds.
In addition to the equations reported in Table 6-2, estimates were
obtained employing several alternative specifications of the life-cycle
and age variables. Tests for nonlinearity in the education and income
terms were negative. For all these specifications, the magnitude and
significance of the race coefficients in the ownership and purchase
equations were virtually unchanged. As a further test of the influence of
housing-market discrimination, separate black and white equations of
the same form as the probability-of-ownership equations were esti-
mated; a covariance test indicated no statistically significant difference
between them (F =1.32).In addition, separate probability-of-ownership
equations were estimated for subsamples of single persons, couples,
female-headed families, and male-headed families. In all four equations,
the coefficient of the race variable was highly significant, varying in
magnitude between —.13and —.16.When similar analyses were per-
formed for the probability of home purchase, the sample sizes became
uncomfortably small for some subgroups, but the results were generally
the same.
It thus appears unlikely that tastes, differences in wealth and assets,
or differences in the specification of income are responsible for the
persistence of the negative and significant race coefficients in the home
ownership and home purchase models.144 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Housing-market discrimination is the third, and to us, the most
plausible hypothesis to explain the regression results shown in the tables
in Chapter 5.Theexact mechanism is naturally hard to specify. Differen-
tial price markups in the owner and rental submarkets do not explain
these differences in black and white purchase and home ownership
probabilities.5 We are forced to conclude that supply restrictions on
black choice of location and on the kinds of housing available to black
households are largely responsible for the wide discrepancy between
ownership rates for otherwise identical black and white households.
Further support for this position is provided by data on the average
increase in the market value of black- and white-owned single-family
units in St. Louis. For this sample, the units owned by white central-city
residents have increased in value at a compound annual rate of 5.2
percentper year, .as contrasted with 7.2 percent annual increase for the
central-city properties owned by black households. If this is interpreted
as a difference iii the net appreciation of ghetto and nonghetto proper-
ties, the findings become quite difficult to explain. However, rather than
indicating a difference in the net appreciation of black- and white-owned
properties, these figures appear to be still another manifestation of
limitations on black residential choice. White households wishing to
improve their housing can buy new or larger houses in better neighbor-
hoods. Black homeowners are much less able to improve their housing
in this way: as a result, black homeowners spend more for renovation
and repair than do white households of similar characteristics and gross
capital appreciation rates are higher. An annual increase in suburban
white-owned properties of 4.1 percent provides some support for these
inferences
DIFFERENCESAMONG METROPOLITAN AREAS
Acomplete test of the supply-restriction hypothesis cannot be
accomplished by means of an analysis of the single metropolitan area. A
more powerful test of the effect of supply restrictions can be obtained by
analyzing differences in black home ownership among cities. Metropoli-
tan areas and their ghettos differ in terms of the characteristics of their
housing stocks, and, therefore, in the extent to which a limitation on the
51n Chapter 8, price markups arepresentedfor owner- and renter-occupied proper-
ties, using the St. Louis sample for three alternative specifications. Of the three specifica-
tions, two indicate a smaller percentage markup in the owner market. Even if the markup
were smaller for rental than for owner-occupied properties, it would require an extremely
large price-elasticity-of-choice to reduce the probability of black ownership by 9 or 10
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ability to reside outside the ghetto is an effective restriction on the
supply of ownership-type housing available to blacks. For example,
supply restrictions should be much less important in Los Angeles, where
a large portion of the ghetto housing supply consists of single-family
units, than in Chicago, where ghetto neighborhoods are predominantly
multifamily. To meet this problem, we analyzed the difference between
"expected" and actual black ownership rates in several metropolitan
areas. "Expected" black ownership rates were computed by multiplying
a matrix of ownership rates by income and family size for white house-
holds by the distribution of black households by income and family size.
Table 6-3presents1960 values of this statistic in the eighteen metropoli-
tan areas for which the necessary census data were published.6 The
TABLE6-3
Actual and "Expected" Ownership Rates of Black










Los Angeles/Long Beach .41 .51
Newark .24 .50
Philadelphia .45 .66






New Orleans .28 .40
Pittsburgh .35 .59
San Francisco/Oakland .37 .51
6These eighteen SMSA's consisted of allthosefor which the data on black and white
ownership rates by income and family-size classes were published. The "expected" black
ownership rate was obtained by applying the ownership proportions for white households
by income and family size for each SMSA to the income and family size distribution of
black households. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Housing: 1960, Vol. II,
Metropolitan Housing (GPO, 1963), Table B3 and summing up.146 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
difference between the actual black ownership rate and the "expected"
black ownership rate for each SMSA is identical in principle to the
difference in the probability of ownership attributed to race in Table 5-1
for St. Louis in 1967. For St. Louis, this more primitive technique
yielded —21.0 for 1960, as compared with the OLS estimate of —15.0 and
the GLS estimate of —8.8 for 1967 shown in Table 5-1.
As a test. of the supply-restriction hypothesis, we then regressed
these estimated differences upon (1) the proportion of central-city dwell-
ing units that are single family, a proxy for the proportion of the ghetto
housing stock that is single family; (2) the proportion of the SMSA black
population living in the central a measure of the extent of suburban-
ization of the black population; and (3) the actual rate of white ownership
in the SMSA.7 The first two variables measure the extent of the supply
restrictions among the eighteen metropolitan areas, while the third
measures any differences in the level of both white and black home
ownership that might be attributable to such factors as intermetropolitan
variation in the relative cost of owner-occupied and renter-occupied
housing or differences in the timing of urban development. Equation 6-1
presentstheregressionindifference form ("expected"black-
ownership rate minus actual black-ownership rate), while Equation 6-2
presents the same equation in ratio form ("expected" black-ownership
rate divided by actual black-ownership rate). t ratios are in parentheses
under the coefficients.
(6-1)(0—OB)= —0.24+ 0.82 —O.36SC+ R2 =.76
(2.36)(4.64) (6.49) (2.03)
(6-2) / OB) =0.89+ —1.74Sf+ R2 =.74
(1.52)(1.47)(5.34)(2.52)
where




=actualblack-ownership rate in the ith SMSA;
a bk.Hbk.],/
7The percent of single-family housing in the central city for SMSA's was obtained
from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Metropolitan Housing, Table B7. The percent of SMSA
blacks residing in the central city was obtained from U.S. Bureauof the Census, Census of
Population: 1960, Vol. I, Characteristics of the Population (GPO, 1963), Table 13.Racial Discrimination and Home Owhership 147
actual white-ownership rate in the ith SMSA;
[ia wkHwic.] ,i/H
and
aWk. =proportionof whites in the kth income/family-size category
who are homeowners in the ith SMSA;
=numberof black households in the kth income/family-size
category in the ith SMSA;
=proportionof central-city housing that is single family (num-
ber of central-city dwelling units that are single family
divided by total central-city dwelling units);
= proportion of metropolitan black households residing in
central city (number of black households in central city
divided by the number of black households in SMSA).
The means and standard deviations of the variables used in Equa-
tions 6-1 and 6-2 are shown in Table 6-4. The average "expected"
home-ownership rate for black households is .54, and the mean actual
black-ownership rate is .35. The actual white rate for these eighteen
metropolitan areas in 1960 averages .65. Of the .30 difference between
actual white- and black-ownership rates in these eighteen metropolitan
areas, black-white differences in family size and income account for .11;
the residual difference, .19 must be attributed to other factors, including
the differences in supply restrictions among the area.s.
Both equations strongly support the hypothesis that the differences
between observed and "expected" black-ownership rates are small: (1)
when the ghetto housing supply includes a large proportion of single-
family units; (2) when blacks have more access to the suburban housing
market, with its preponderance of owner-occupied units. As the statis-
tics in Table 6-3 show, the difference between the actual and "expected"
TABLE6-4
Means and Standard Deviations of Variab'es
Used in Intercity Regressions
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home ownership rate of black households is relatively small fOr cities
like Houston and Los Angeles, where the central city and its black
ghetto include more single-family housing, and it is relatively large for
cities like Chicago, where the ghetto is predominantly multifamily, and
where blacks are effectively excluded from the suburbs.
The extent of black suburbanization also appears to have a signifi-
cant, though small, influence on the gap between actual and "expected"
black home ownership. In all United States. metropolitan areas, black
households are heavily concentrated in the central cities. The mean
proportion of blacks residing in the central city for the sample metropoli-
tan areas is .78, and the standard deviation is only .14. Equation 6-1
indicates that a metropolitan area in which the proportion of blacks
living in the central city is one standard deviation larger than the mean
(92 percent of metropolitan-area blacks live in the central city) would
have a gap .034 larger than one in which the proportion of blacks living in
the central city is one standard deviation below the mean (64 percent of
blacks live in the central city).
The findings presented in Equations 6-1 and 6-2 provide further
support for the view that housing-market discrimination limits black
home ownership.8 Specifically, these results indicate that a limited
supply of housing suitable for home ownership in the ghetto, and restric-
tions on black purchase outside the ghetto, strongly affect the tenure-
type of the housing consumed by black households as well as its
location.
HOMEOWNERSHIP, HOUSING COSTS, AND
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
Limitationson home ownership have significant effects on black
housing costs, income, and welfare. As Appendix C illustrates, an
effective limitation on home ownership can increase black housing costs
by over 30 percent, assuming no price appreciation.
Much of the saving from home ownership results from the favorable
treatment accorded to homeowners under federal income-tax laws. Pro-
visions favoring homeowners are widely recognized and well docu-
mented.9 Our findings suggest that black households at all income levels
are impeded by housing-market discrimination from purchasing single-
family homes. As a consequence, black households cannot take full
8At the minImum, It would take a peculiar spatial distribution of "tastes for home
ownership" or of asset differences to explain these findings.
9Henry Aaron, "Income Taxes and Housing," American Economic Review 60, no. 5
(Dec. 1970): 789—806; John P. Shelton, "The Costs of Renting Versus Owning a Home,"
Land Economics 44, no. 1 (Feb. 1968): 59—72.Racial Discrimination and Home Ownership. 149
advantage of these tax benefits. Since tax savings from home ownership
increase with income, this aspect of discriminatory housing markets
most sharply hits middle- and upper-income black households.
Limitations on home ownership also deprive black households of an
important inflation hedge, available to other low- and middle-income
households. Calculations presented in Appendix C show that under
reasonable assumptions regarding the appreciation of single-family
homes, a black household prevented from buying a home in 1950 and
subsequently would have out-of-pocket housing costs in 1970 more than
twice those which they would have incurred had they been able to
purchase a home twenty years earlier.
Black households at every income level possess less wealth than
white households. Current and historical limitations on home ownership
may be an important reason. The significance of home ownership as a
method of capital accumulation among low- and middle-income house-
holds emerges from the following typical example. The average house
purchased with an FHA 203 mortgage in 1949 had a value of $8,286 and a
mortgage of $7,101.10 if such a house had been purchased with a twenty-
year mortage by a thirty-year-old head of household, the purchaser
would have saved more than $7,000 by his fiftieth birthday, owning his
home free and clear. Thus, ii his home neither appreciated nor depre-
ciated, at age fifty he would own assets worth at least How-
ever, the postwar years have hardly been characterized by price stabil-
ity. Although difficult to estimate, the average appreciation of single-
family houses during the past twenty years has undoubtedly exceeded
the 100 percent increase in the Boeckh composite cost index for small
residential structures.'2 This conservative 100 percent increase in value
would mean that the typical FHA-financed homeowner would have
accumulated assets worth at least $16,000 by fifty, a considerable sum
that could be used to reduce housing costs, to borrow against for the
college education of his children, or simply held for retirement. Some
perspective on this hypothetical example is obtained when one takes into
10U.S. Federal Housing Administration, FHA Homes, 1967: Data for States and
SelectedAreas on Characteristics of FHA OperationsUnder Section 203(Washington,
D.C.: Federa] Housing Administration, Division of Research and Statistics, Statistics
Section, 1967).
11The mean net wealth of U.S. black families was estimated at $3,779 in 1966, as
compared to a mean net wealth of U.S. white families of $20,153 in the same year. By
income class, black wealth varied from a low of 16 percent of white income in the range of
$2,500 to $4,999 to a high of 47 percent of white income in the range $15,000 to $19,999.
Henry S. Terrell, "Wealth Accumulation of Black and White Families: The Empirical
Evidence," Journal of Finance 26, no. 2 (May 1971): 364.
'2Our sample suggests an annual rate of increase in value of white-owned properties
of 4.7 percent during the five- to ten-year period prior to 1967.150 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
account the fact that the mean wealth accumulation of white households
in 1966 was only $20,000.13 Of course, the situation would have been
different if the postwar period had been one of a general decline in the
price of urban real estate, but it was not.
Home ownership has clearly been the most important method of
wealth accumulation for low- and middle-income families in the postwar
period. Equities in single-family owner-occupied structures account for
nearly one-half of all the wealth of the lowest income group. As family
income increases, the relative importance of home equities decreases.
Nonetheless, home equities accounted for more than one-third of the
wealth of all United States households earning between $10,000 and
$15,000 in
Much of the savings embedded in home ownership, especially
among low- and middle-income households, is more or less involuntary
or at least unconscious. Discipline is maintained by linking investments
(savings) to monthly payments for the provision of a necessity; with
heavy penalties (foreclosure) imposed for failure to invest regularly.15
Moreover, because of federal mortgage insurance and special advan-
tages provided to thrift institutions, low- and middle-income home buy-
ers are abl.e to borrow 90 percent or more of the purchase price of a new
home. This may amount to $15,000 or more of capital at moderate
interest rates. By comparison, in the stock market he can borrow 30
percent, a ratio which he must maintain even with price declines.
If, as our findings suggest, discrimination in urban housing markets
has reduced black opportunities for home ownership, this limitation is an
important explanation of the smaller quantity of assets owned by black
households at each income level.
'3Terrell,"Wealth Accumulation."
14D. S. Projector et al,, "Survey of Changes in Family Finances," Federal Reserve
Technical Paper (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
1968).
'5As long ago as 1953, James Duesenberry argued persuasively that levels of savings
and asset accumulation are heavily dependent upon the form in which savings is main-
tained. Citing specifically the high proportion of savings invested in assets associated with
the reasonforsaving (e.g. housing equity, pension and insurance reserves, and investment
in unincorporated businesses), he suggests a close connection between the motives for
saving and the form which the saving takes. Thus, although we cannot deducethatbecause
people invested in some particular asset, they would not have saved if that type of asset had
not been available, there appears to be a strong association. If Duesenberry's insight is
valid, then even ifcapitalmarkets were perfect in every sense of the word, we would
expect to find substantially fewer assets for households denied certain forms of saving
(i.e.., those forms associated with the reason for saving) such as home ownership,
pension and insurance investment, and unincorporated business investment. James S.
Duesenberry, "The Determinants of Savings Behavior: A Summary," in Savings in the
Modern Economy, Walter W. Heller, Francis M. Boddy, and Carl L. Nelson, eds.
(Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1953).Racial Discrimination and Home Ownership 151
OTHEREVIDENCE ON HOME OWNERSHIP AND
WEALTH
Ina recent paper, Howard Birnbaum and Rafael Weston attempt to
assess the effect of differences in wealth on the probability of home
ownership by black and white households.'6 Their analysis uses data
from the 1969 Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO), one of the few
sample surveys to obtain information on assets and wealth. (The SEO
sample, in common with the data used in this study, oversamples low-
income neighborhoods.) Birnbaum and Weston first reestimate probabil-
ity-of-ownership equations similar to the ones we present in Table 5-1,
using a random sample of four-hundred black and five-hundred white
households drawn from the national SEO sample of thirty-thousand
households. Because some of the variables we used were unavailable
from the SEO Survey, the equations were not precisely identical. Even
so, they obtained quite similar results. Birnbaum and Weston then esti-
mated a second equation, which included a household assets variable.
Finally, they performed a similar analysis for the St. Louis households
included in the SEO sample.
Using the national sample, Birnbaum and Weston obtain an esti-
mate of —0.093 (t=2.60) for the race coefficient when no asset variable is
included. When they add assets to the equation, the race coefficient
declines in absolute value to —0.059 (t =1.78).Their finding using the St.
Louis sample was similar: when no asset variable is included, the
coefficient of the race variable is —0.10 (t =1.22);when the asset
variable is included, it becomes —0.03 (t =1.22).The St. Louis sample
consisted of only 172 observations as compared to their national sample,
which consisted of 900 observations.
Birnbaum and Weston also estimate separate equations for white
and for black households. Our finding, following a similar procedure,
was that the difference i.n white and black home ownership and purchase
could be adequately represented by a race dummy. When Birnbaum and
Weston performed comparable tests, they found that the two samples
could not be pooled in this way.
At first glance, these findings by Birnbaum and Weston seem to
undermine our analyses of the causes of housing-market discrimination.
Further reflection, however, suggests that such a conclusion is unwar-
ranted. First, the analyses by Birnbaum and Weston have no direct
bearing on our intercity tests of racial differences in the probability of
home ownership. Second, there are serious difficulties with the use of an
asset variable in a single-equation model of home ownership.
'6Howard Birnbaum and Rafael Weston, "Homeownership and the Wealth Position
of Black and White Americans," Review of Income and Wealth, series 20, no. 1 (March
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As is apparent from our discussion of home ownership and savings,
home ownership is the dominant method used by low- and middle-
income households to accumulate wealth. Therefore, differences in
wealth between white and black households at the same income level
may be more a conseqñence of white-black differences in home owner-
ship than the converse. This is particularly true when separate equations
are estimated for black and white households. The evidence suggests
that in Birnbaum and Weston's analysis of home ownership for black
households, the variable measuring assets virtually acts as a dummy
variable representing home ownership. For example, the coefficient of
the wealth variable is four times as large in the equation estimated for
blacks than in that for whites.
Birnbaum and Weston are aware of these difficulties and counteract
them in part by estimating probability-of-ownership equations using
different definitions of wealth. The Birnbaum-Weston national equation
without an asset variable had a race coefficient of —0.093 (t =2.60),
while the equation including all forms of wealth had a coefficient of
—0.059 (t =1.78).When the authors excluded home equity from the
definition of wealth, the coefficient became —0.061 (t =1.39),and when
they excluded home equity, farm equity, and business equity, it became
—0.082 (t =2.64).
Both our discussion of the relationship between savings and home-
ownership and the analyses by Birnbaum and Weston illustrate that the
processes determining household decisions to purchase or to own a
home and the accumulation of wealth are closely intertwined. This
suggests the desirability of some form of simultaneous-equation estima-
tion in which households' savings-investment and renting-owning deci-
sions are simultaneously determined. Existing data do not support so
ambitious an approach. In the absence of such a formulation, our
analyses, which exclude assets, can be regarded as a reduced-form
equation derived from a system of structural equations in which wealth
and home ownership are jointly determined.
SUMMARY
Thischapter extends the analysis of home ownership and home
purchase presented in Chapter 5 and considers the effect of race upon
home ownership and, more broadly, upon household capital accumula-
tion.
The analysis indicates that for households of similar income, com-
position, and labor-force characteristics, black households are substan-
tially less likely to be homeowners or home purchasers than white
households. This conclusion holds even when prior tenure status is
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Other than as a result of housing-market discrimination, this finding
could arise if there were systematic differences in the expected long-run
income between otherwise identical black and white households (house-
holds identical in terms of annual income, education, and labor-force
attachment). Several crude tests using alternative definitions of long-run
or "permanent" income indicate that differences in permanent income
do not account for the lower probability of ownership and purchase by
black households than comparable white households.
Conceivably, these results could be explained by systematic differ-
ences in "tastes" for home ownership between otherwise identical black
and white households. Considering the fairly elaborate description of the
households used iii the analysis (including income, education, employ-
ment status and duration, family size, family composition, and life-cycle
influences), we find the "tastes" explanation improbable. In addition,
the analysis of household mobility in Chapter 5 indicates that, at compa-
rable annual incomes, educations, labor-force attachments, and demo-
graphic compositions, black households have slightly lower mobility
rates than white households. If it is assumed that more mobile house-
holds have weaker preference for home ownership, this difference in
tastes would suggest higher rather than lower rates of home ownership
among black households.
An intercity analysis of differences in the actual and "expected"
probabilities of home ownership by black households in several large
SMSA's provides further evidence that the lower levels of home owner-
ship among black households in St. Louis are not due to differences in
tastes. The "expected" levels of black ownership in each SMSA are
based on analysis of white rates of ownership by income and family-size
catagories and on the number of black households in each category.
On the basis of these several findings, we conclude that the much
lower probabilities of home ownership and home purchase among black
households are the result of systematic discrimination against black
households in St. Louis' housing market.
The rest of this chapter, together with the analysis presented in
Appendix C, indicates how an effective limitation on home purchase can
affect the savings behavior and wealth accumulation of black house-
holds. These effects arise from the almost unique role that home owner-
ship plays in the asset portfolios of lower- and middle-income Ameri-
cans, due to its direct link between investment and consumption, its
greater potential for leverage, and its availability to less sophisticated
investors. In addition, the postwar history of capital appreciation in
residential housing assets indicates that substantial differences in the
current wealth positions of "otherwise comparable" white and black
households may arise from denial of the opportunity for home purchase
and home ownership.